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Notes
INCHOATE DOWER-AN IDEA WHOSE
TIME IS PAST
INTRODUCTION
John and Mary Jones have been happily married for 20 years.
John owns a farm in Anytown, Kentucky. One night they have an
argument over whether Mary has been seeing another man. Unfor-
tunately John's timing was bad because the very next day he receives
an offer to sell the farm which he inherited from his father at a
substantial profit. He goes to his attorney and the deed is prepared
but Mary, still pouting over John's accusation, refuses to sign the deed
and the chance for the profit is destroyed because the buyer refuses to
buy the property subject to Mary's inchoate dower rights.1
John and Mary Smith have been happily married for 20 years. He
owns personal property in the form of stocks. One day John and Mary
argue about whether they should retain the stock. The next day John
sells the stock because the market price jumped $20 a share overnight.
Since Mary has no inchoate dower rights in the personal property
John was able to sell the stock without her signature.
Inchoate dower does not apply to personal property and it no
longer is necessary to protect surviving spouses from becoming desti-
tute. As our society becomes more urban most estates are largely
made up of personal property. Inchoate dower was necessary when a
sizable amount of our wealth was in the form of land. It was a good
idea, but its time has past and now its protective function has become
a restraint on alienation of land. No matter the price the buyer is
willing to pay, John Jones cannot pass a "clear" title to the farm with-
out Mary's signature on the deed.
HISTORICAL FUNCrION OF DowER
Modem estates of dower had their origins when land was the
principal form of wealth and functioned to protect the widow and
prevent her from becoming a burden on society.
2
1 Inchoate dower is the wife's interest in the lands of her husband during his
life, which may become a right of dower upon his death. See Smith v. Shaw, 22
N.E. 924 (Mass. 1889).
2 Lewis, It's Time to Abolish Dower and Curtesy in Virginia, 3 U. RcH. L.
REv. 299, 305 (1969).
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Dower is very ancient. Its origin is so remote that neither Coke
nor Blackstone could trace it, and it is said to be as widespread as
the Christian religion and to enter into the contract of marriage
among all Christians. Dower is thus one of the most ancient
institutions of the English common law. Even in Anglo-Saxon times
it seems to have existed substantially in the form it bears in the
later common law, possibly as the relic of a Danish custom. There
is no question that dower was recognized and provision made
therefor in Magna Carta in 1215 and in charters thereafter in
1216 and 1217.3
Dower at early common law was principally of two kinds: ad ostium
eclesiae, or at the church door, and ex assensu patris, or by the con-
sent of the father. Dower ad ostium eclesiae was given openly at the
time of the marriage ceremony. The influence of the church is quite
evident in this form of dower which required a formal marriage
ceremony. Informal or clandestine marriages did not confer any legal
protection upon the widow. Deathbed endowments were not recog-
nized by the common law. Also there was a requirement that the
husband could only confer dower out of the land which he held in
fee at the time of the marriage. 4 At the time of the husband's death,
such properly granted dower could be entered upon by the widow
without further ceremony.5
Dower ex assensu patris also was given at the church door after a
formal marriage ceremony. Here the husband endowed his wife with
the land upon which she might enter upon his death without further
ceremony, but it was the father of the bridegroom who was seized in
fee of the lands so endowed. Therefore the consent of the father was
necessary. Once the consent was expressly given the wife could enter
upon her dower after the death of her husband even though the
father was still alive.6 Both of these estates were later abolished by
statute in England.7
Other types of dower included dower prescribed by law, dower by
the custom, and dower de la pluis beale. Dower prescribed by law
differed from the two major types discussed above in that it was not
founded upon contract but upon the law.8 In dower by the custom
8 Am. Jun. 2d Dower § 14 (1966); The common law provision that endowed
the wife with one-third of the husband s property appears to have had its origin in
the Magna Carta. See F. PoLLOCK & F. M uTLAND, Tx HIS'ToRY OF ENGLISH
LAw 421 (2d ed. 1911).
4 T. PLUCxNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMmON LAW 566 (5th ed.
1956). See also PoLLocx & MArrLAND supra note 3, at 420-428.
5 Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 137, 138 (1875).
6 id.
7 8 & 4 Will. 4, c. 105 (1883).8 Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 137 (1875).
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the widow was entitled to a peculiar and unusual allotment of dower
varying with the particular locality.9 Dower de la pluis beale
existed where the husband held a portion of his lands by
knight service, and a portion in socage,' 0 and died leaving a widow
and a son within the age of 14 years, and the lord of whom the
land was held in knight's service entered upon that portion as
guardian in chivalry during the nonage of the infant, and the widow
entered upon and occupied the residue as guardian in socage. If, in
such case, the widow brought a writ to be endowed of the whole
premises, she was compelled to endow herself de la pluis beale,
that is, of the fairest portion of the tenements held by her guardian
in socage."
In England today dower has ceased to be of practical importance.'1
However, dower is a significant source of estates for life in many
American jurisdictions. The English distrust of dower is evidenced
by the fact that some American colonies enabled a husband to defeat
dower simply by a deed or a will. Nevertheless the early distrust of
dower gave way to the stricter rule of the common law. In many
states the institution of dower is still a significant source of estates for
life.13
DowER As IT ExsTrs IN KmCncy
Statutory dower is the only remnant of common law dower extant
in Kentucky. Kentucky Revised Statutes [hereinafter KRS] 392.020
states:
[The surviving spouse] shall have an estate for his or her life in
one-third of any real estate of which the other spouse or anyone
for the use of the other spouse, was seized of an estate in fee simple
during the coverture but not at the time of death, unless the sur-
vivor's right to such interest has been barred, forfeited or relin-
quished.14
9 State Corp. Comm'n v. Dunn, 94 S.E. 481, 487 (N.C. 1917) (dissenting
opinion).
10 Socage was a type of tenure whereby the tenant held certain lands in
consideration of certain inferior services of husbandry to be performed by him to
the lord of the fee. BLACK'S LAW DICrIoNARY 1561 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
l State Corp. Comm'n v. Dunn, 94 S.E. 481, 487 (N.C. 1917) (dissenting
opinion).
12 See 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 105 (1833).
Is Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, West
Virginia and Wisconsin. 2 B. POWELL REAL PROPERTY § 213 (1971). Georgia and
Oregon in the above list have abolished dower since 1967. Id. (Supp. 1970).
Maryland has also abolished dower Code 1957, Art. 93, § 3-202 (1969).
14 It is necessary to point out that Kentucky defines dower as anything the
surviving spouse takes under Ky. REv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 392.020.
(Continued on next page)
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In Kentucky dower gives the widow a life estate in one-third of the
land whereof the husband was seised in his own right at any time
during coverture and which would be inherited by any child born
of the marriage.15 However, it is not necessary that there should
actually be a child born.16 Although most definitions of dower are
couched in terms of the wife, in Kentucky the husband also is granted
an equivalent interest in the estate of the wife.17
The prerequisites for dower are (1) a valid marriage of the parties
and (2) the deceased spouse must have been seised of an estate of
inheritance during coverture.
A valid marriage was a very real problem in early English law due
to conflicts between the jurisdictions of lay and ecclesiastical courts.'"
In the United States the problem has not been one of jurisdiction,
but one of a defect in the marriage itself. Examples of marital defects
that would bar the estate of dower in the surviving spouse are marriage
to an incompetent, incestuous marriages, and bigamous marriages.
The surviving spouse is not entitled to dower if at the time of the
marriage the decedent was insane.' 9 Likewise, incestuous marriages
such as between testator and niece20 and between first cousins21 serve
to defeat dower in the surviving spouse. The effect of a bigamous
marriage depends upon the sex of the violator.22 If the violator is
the husband the first wife is still protected, whereas if the violator
is the wife she forfeits her claim to dower in her first husband's estate.
23
The second requirement for the surviving spouse to take dower is
that the other spouse must have been seised of an estate of inheritance
during coverture. This second prerequisite can best be explained by
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
It will be necessary to abolish only the clause that gives the surviving spouse a life
estate in one-third of all real estate conveyed during coverture to effectuate the
changes suggested by this Note.
' 5 Casky v. Casky, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 769 (1884); Wigginton v. Leech's Adm'x.,
149 S.W.2d 531 (Ky. 1941), held that a widow's right of dower is not merely a
lien but is an individual interest, which vests at the time of the marriage, or as to
subsequently acquired property, at the time of acquisition by the husband and is a
"vested interest" which can be released or extinguished when she pursues the law
in that regard.
16 Id.
17Ky. Rev. Stat. § 892.010 (1971). With regard to the discussion of
dower in Kentucky, the terms husband and wife are relatively interchangeable.
18 2 R. PowELL supra note 12, at § 209(1).
19 Jenkins v. Jenkin's Heirs, 32 Ky. 102 (1884).2 0 McIlvain v. Scheibley, 59 S.W. 498 (Ky. 1900).
21 Ex parte Bowen, 247 S.W.2d 379 (Ky. 1952). KRS § 402.010 (1971) pro-
hibits incestuous marriages.22 KRS § 486.080 (1971).
28 KRS § 892.100 (1971). See also Bates v. Meade, 192 S.W. 666 (Ky. 1917);
Powell v. Calvert, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 769 (1884); Donnelly v. Donnelly Heirs, 47
Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 118 (1847).
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examining its three essential components. Seisin, Estate of Inheritance,
and Land Held During Coverture.
Seisin
There can be no dower in land which the husband, during cover-
ture, was not actually seised, 24 or had no right to seisure.2 5 It is not
essential to the surviving spouse's right of dower that the deceased
was in fact in possession of the land at any time during coverture,
the right to possession being sufficient.26 However, it is necessary
that the seisin be in fee.27 Thus, the Kentucky Court has held an
occasional cutting of timber and tanbark by the husband upon an
unenclosed tract of wild land, and the listing of the land for taxation
in his name, was not sufficient evidence of seisin to vest in him the
fee, so as to entitle the wife to dower.28
Estate of Inheritance
At common law a requirement for dower was that the estate of
the husband during coverture be an estate of inheritance. In Kentucky
the statutory dower requires that the "other spouse [be] seised of
an estate in fee simple."2 9 As a result there is no dower right in a life
estate held by the deceased spouse.30 Thus if a spouse conveys real
estate to a trustee to be held in trust for the benefit of a child during
its life, and then to its lawful heirs, with no power of the child to sell
or dispose of the property, the child has only a life estate and the
child's widow could not claim dower.3 ' Moreover if the deceased
spouse held only equitable title to the real estate, as in trust, no dower
rights may be claimed.32
Where the deceased spouse has an interest in land as a joint
tenant33 or tenant in common, the surviving spouse is entitled to dower.
However, where the deceased spouse held partnership property, the
real estate is treated as a partnership fund and the surviving spouse
24 Walters v. Anderson, 361 S.W.2d 31 (Ky. 1962) (executive sale effectively
deprived husband of seisin).2 5 Hall v. Campbell, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 246, 12 Ky. Opin. 673 (1883). See 2 B.
PowELr. supra note 13, § 209(1) for a more detailed discussion of seisin.
26Ferguson v. Ferguson, 156 S.W. 413 (Ky. 1913).
27 KRS § 392.020 (1971). See also Chalk v. Chalk, 165 S.W.2d 534 (Ky.
1942).
28 Smallridge v. Hazlett, 66 S.W. 1043 (Ky. 1902).
29 KRS § 392.020 (1971).
30 Ford v. Yost, 190 S.W.2d 21 (Ky. 1945); Bodkin v. Wright, 100 S.W.2d
824 (Ky. 1937).
3 Bodkin v. Wright, 100 S.W.2d (Ky. 1937).32Tevis v. Steele, 20 Ky. (4 T.B. Mon.) 339 (1827).
33 Davis v. Logan, 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 185 (1839).
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of the deceased partner is not entitled to dower until the partnership
debts are paid.34 In addition, where a part of the purchase money is
due and the administrator sells the land under court order and
applies the proceeds to payment of the balance, the dower of the
surviving spouse is limited to a share of the residue.3 5
In addition to the problem of whether the deceased spouse held
the necessary interest in real estate for dower to be claimed there are
also problems as to what types of property may be classified as real
estate and thus subject to dower. It has been held that stock in a
railroad company is real estate to which dower attaches. 36 Oil wells
and other mines which a deceased spouse opened on the land during
his life or which he was under a binding contract to open at the time
of his death, have been held real estate. A distinction has been made
with regard to opened and unopened mines.37 However, with respect
to unopened mines, dower has been denied.38 Dower may also be
claimed in royalities accruing from oil and other minerals taken from
the real estate. 9 In the event that the decendent's estate is an oil or
gas leasehold, it is less than a fee simple and therefore not subject to
dower.40
Land Held During Coverture
Another requirement for dower is that the land be held during
coverture. This requirement though simple on its face has been com-
plicated by: (1) the problems and issues created by conveyances
before marriage; (2) property acquired during coveture that is sub-
ject to encumbrances; and (3) such devices as antenuptial or post-
nuptial agreements. A deed executed by a husband, on the day of his
marriage, selling his land does not deprive the wife of dower.
41
However, if before the marriage an option is given to purchase land,
34 Bennett v. Bennett, 121 S.W. 495 (Ky. 1909); Ellis v. Johnson, 4 Ky. Law
Rep. 991, 12 Ky. Opin. 163 (1883). Where no partnership exists when the land is
purchased, a subseguent appropriation of the property for partnership purposes
will not bar the widow of one of the partners from her dower. Bowler v. Blair, 6
Ky. Law Rep. 666, 13 Ky. Opin. 324 (1885).35 Brewer v. Vanarsdale s Heirs, 36 Ky. (6 Dana) 204 (1838).
6 Copeland v. Copeland, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 349 (1870). Price v. Price's Heirs,
36 Ky. (6 Dana) 107 (1838). It does not make any difference that a portion of
the amount due on the stock has been paid since the death of the holder.
37 Grain v. West, 229 S.W. 51 (Ky. 1921).
8 Daniels v. Charles, 189 S.W. 192 (Ky. 1916); Whitaker v. Lindley, 3 S.W.
9 (Ky. 1887). See also Roberts, Dower Rights Under Oil and Gas Leases, 13
WAsH. & LE L. REv. 15 (1958).
39Bartletts Admr v. Buckner's Adm'r, 54 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1932).40 Buehrer v. Gates, 411 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. 1967). This case seems to be
inconsistent with Kentucky's previously unique rule as to mineral leases as stated
in Pursifull's Adm'r v. Purmifll, 184 S.W.2d 967 (Ky. 1945).
4' Stewart's Lessee v. Stewart 26 Ky. (3 J.J. Marsh) 48 (1829).
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the surviving spouse may not claim dower if the option is exercised
within the time prescribed in the option agreement.4 2 In addition,
where a contract is made to sell realty before the marriage, although
the conveyance is not made until after the marriage, the surviving
spouse is not entitled to dower.43
Since an estate of dower partakes of the nature of the estate of the
decedent,44 if the decedent held the property subject to encum-
brances the dower will also be subject to the encumbrances. If the
land is held subject to a vendor's lien for the purchase money the right
to dower is subordinate to the vendor's lien.4 5 The right to dower
is also subordinate to tax liens. Absent a lien or its equivalent, how-
ever, the right to dower is not subject to the debts of the surviving
spouse .4  Even where the executors have transferred property to the
surviving spouse in lieu of a claim for dower it has been held that
(absent collusion) such agreement and conveyance bind the creditors
and the conveyance is not voidable by the creditors even though it
was not a good bargain with regard to the surviving spouse.4 7
Generally it has been held that dower may be relinquished by an
antenuptial agreement. However, the agreement must be made in the
absence of fraud, the spouse must be sui juris,48 and the agreement
must clearly show an intention to make provision therein in lieu of
dower.49 Thus, where a husband entered into an antenuptial agree-
ment, conveyed all his lands to his children and died without making
provisions for his widow, the Court subjected the conveyances to the
terms of the antenuptial agreement.50 Also, where a wife has knowl-
edge of the extent of the husband's estate and is sui juris generally
she will not be allowed to disclaim the antenuptial agreement.51 Post-
nuptial agreements have also been held to be valid. Where a spouse,
for consideration, relinquishes a right to dower the spouse cannot later
repudiate the agreement and demand dower 52 but the agreement must
be an "arm's-length" transaction. Jointure agreements are valid if
4 2 Mineral Dev. Co. v. Hall, 115 S.W. 230 (1909).
4
3 Gully v. Ray, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 107 (1857).44 Porter's Heirs v. Robinson, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh) 253 (1821).
45KRS § 392.040 (1971); McMurray v. McMurray, 410 S.W.2d 139 (1966);
Chalk v. Chalk, 165 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1942); Matney v. Williams, 89 S.W.678 (Ky.
1905).
46 KRS § 92.590 (1971), KBS § 134.420 (1971); Chalk v. Chalk, 165 S.W.2d
534 (Ky. 1942).4 7 Wyrick v. Wyrick, 243 S.W.2d 1004 (Ky. 1952); Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Lewis, 124 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1939).48 Harrow v. Johnson, 60 Ky. (3 Metc.) 578 (1861).
49 Forwood v. Forwood, 5 S.W. 361 (Ky. 1887).
50 Hardesty v. Hardesty's Ex'r, 34 S.W.2d 442 (Ky. 1931).
51 C arrard v. Garrard, 70 Ky. (7 Bush.) 436 (1870).
5
2 Forwood v. Forwood, 5 S.W. 361 (Ky. 1887).
1972.] NoTs
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they are in satisfaction of dower. Jointure is generally a competent
livelihood for the wife in the husband's property to take effect after
his death and is conveyed or devised to the wife in lieu of dower.5 3
It may consist of either real or personal property.5
4
RELiNQuiSmvmNT OF DowER IN KENTUCKY
A spouse has no power to defeat the inchoate right of dower
without the other spouse's consent. A spouse can only lose dower by
selling it, forfeiting it or by death.5 5 Dower can be relinquished by
alienation only in the statutory modes, that is, by the execution of a
deed with his or her spouse (or by separate deed if he has already
conveyed) and by privy acknowledgment before a proper officer.56
A dower interest in land cannot be relinquished or transferred by a
mere verbal declaration, however formal the manner in which it may
be made or certified.57 In order to effectively relinquish dower the
name of both spouses must appear in the body of the deed and thus
a mere signing and acknowledgment of the instrument by one spouse
will not operate to convey the dower rights in the property.58 However,
the failure of a deed to include a spouse's name in the caption or
granting habendum clause has been held not fatal in relinquishing
dower.59 In the event that a wife releases her dower rights in the
manner provided by statute (by joining with her husband in con-
veyance of the property) it is not essential for the conveyance to
operate that she should receive a separate and independent con-
sideration.60
The husband's title to land sold under decree may be acquired,
but this does not divest the wife of her right to dower therein.6'
Where land is sold at judicial sale subject to dower, the purchaser or
his vendees having knowledge of the dower interest hold the land
subject to the dower right.62 However, a wife's consent to a judicial
sale of her husband's land and her acceptance of a part of the pur-
53 Loud v. Loud, 67 Ky. (4 Bush.) 453 (1869); Morgan v. Sparks, 108 S.W.
283 (Ky. 1869).
54 Maynard's Adm'r v. Maynard, 140 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1941); Tevis' Ex'r v.
McCreary, 60 Ky. (3 Metc.) 151 (1800).
55 Rowe v. Ratliff, 104 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1937).
56 Hanna's Assignees v. Gay, 78 S.W. 915 (Ky. 1904).
57 Worthington v. Middleton, 36 Ky. (6 Dana) 300 (1938).
58 Beverly v. Walker, 74 S.W. 264 (Ky. 1903) (mortgage); Measels v. Martin,
18 S.W. 359, rev'd, 18 S.W. 1029 (Ky. 1890); Buford's A r v. Guthrie, 77 Ky.
(14 Bush.) 690 (1879).
59 Hackney v. Smith, 273 S.W. 476 (Ky. 1925).
60 Moore v. Hudson, 240 S.W. 383 (Ky. 1922).
61 Myers v. Happerton, 3 Ky. Opin. 628 (1868).62 Young v. Strother, 3 Ky. Law Rep. 695, 11 Ky. Opin. 575 (1882).
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chase money estops her from asserting her inchoate right of dower.63
But, a wife cannot by her acts and declarations be estopped from
asserting dower unless to permit her to do so would operate as a
fraud.64 Thus for example, a public announcement by a wife at the
commissioner's sale of her husband's land that she will not claim
dower against any person who shall become the purchaser estops her
from asserting dower against one purchasing in reliance on such a
declaration.0
The wife can pass a dower interest by deed and her creditors can
have the dower allotted and subjected to their claims. 6 But if the
husband executes an assignment for creditors, and the wife does not
join, the assignment has no effect on her dower interest.67 A mortgage
properly executed by husband and wife waives dower rights under
Kentucky law but only as to the mortgage creditor.68
A spouse in certain instances may lose the right to dower as a con-
sequence of misconduct. It has been held that where a wife leaves her
husband voluntarily to live in adultery she forfeits her right to dower 9
but a subsequent reconciliation would appear to reinstate her rights.70
A promiscuous wife who wishes to have her cake and eat it too must
continue to live with her husband while engaging in the adulterous
relationship if she wishes to retain her claim to dower in her husband's
estate.71 If the misconduct of a spouse is wrongful killing, the rights
to dower are not forfeited by such action.7 2 Termination of the marital
relationship by divorce cuts off the estate of dower. However a
divorce from bed and board does not bar the right to dower,73 and
a divorce obtained in another state does not affect the right to dower
in real estate situated in Kentucky.74 The right to have dower as-
signed75 ends at the death of the surviving husband or wife, and does
63 Mcllvain v. Moss, 3 Ky. Opin. 508 (1869).
64 Syck v. Helier, 131 S.W. 30 (Ky. 1910).
OrConnolly v. Branstler, 66 Ky. (3 Bush.) 702 (1868). See also Walters v.
Anderson, 361 S.W.2d 31 (Ky. 1962); Oldham v. McElroy, 121 S.W. 414 (Ky.
1909); Craddock v. Tyler, 66 Ky. (3 Bush.) 360 (1868).66 Wintersmith v. Goodin, 4 Ky. Opin. 67 (1871).
67 Hanna's Assignees v. Gay, 78 S.W. 915 (Ky. 1904).
68 In re Gish, 32 F.2d 322 (1929).
69 McQuinn v. McQuinn, 61 S.W. 358 (1901). See also Ferguson v. Ferguson,
156 S.W. 413 (Ky. 1913); Bond v. Bonds Adm'r, 150 S.W. 363 (Ky. 1912).
70 Id.
71 Sergent v. North Cumberland Mfg. Co., 66 S.W. 1036 (Ky. 1902).
7 2 Eversole v. Eversole, 185 S.W. 487 (Ky. 1916).
7 3 Lively v. Lively, 7 Ky. Law Rep. 838 (1886).
7 4 Hawkins v. Ragsdale, 80 Ky. 353, 4 Ky. Law Rep. 184 (1882).7 5 Assignment of dower is the act by which the share of a widow in her
deceased husband's real estate is ascertained and set apart to her. BLACx's L~w
DicnoxARY 153 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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not pass to the personal representative of the surviving spouse.76 If
dower is assigned to the surviving spouse since it is only a life estate
the decedent has no interest which can be inherited.
Ricais AND REmEDiES OF THE SuRvIVING SPousE x KENTUCKY
The right to dower, until it is assigned, is a right resting in action
only. It can be released, but not transferred so as to invest another
with the right to an action for it, and moreover an award of dower will
extinguish the action for it.77 After the death of the decedent and
before the assignment of dower to the surviving spouse, the surviving
spouse is entitled to possession of the decedents land in which the
dower rights exist.78 The surviving spouse is treated as a "tenant at
will" 79 until dower or homestead is assigned and after that as a "tenant
for life."80 In addition, the surviving spouse is not chargeable with
rent for use and occupancy of a house prior to the assignment of
dower.8 1
The surviving spouse must elect whether to take dower or home-
stead since they are mutually exclusive.82 The mere fact that the
widow remains in the house of her husband for a few years after his
death does not establish conclusively that she has elected to take
homestead instead of dower.83 However after the lapse of a reasonable
time, where no election has been made, it will be conclusively pre-
sumed that the surviving spouse took the estate or right which was
most beneficial. 84 In addition, a court may elect homestead or dower
for the surviving spouse where no election has been made, but it is
incumbent on the court to elect the estate that is the most beneficial
to the surviving spouse.85
If the spouse's choice is dower rather than homestead he or she may
elect to take the present cash value of the dower right in lieu of the
one-third life estate. Under Kentucky law, a widow is entitled to an
assignment of a life interest in one-third of husband's real estate by
76 Cain's Adm'r v. Ky. & Ind. Bridge & R. Co., 99 S.W. 297 (Ky. 1907).
77 Shield's Heirs v. Batts, 28 Ky. (5 J.J. Marsh.) 12 (1830).7 8 Robinson v. Miller, 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 88 (1840).
79 Jordan v. Sheridan, 149 S.W. 1028 (Ky. 1912).
80 Wisnv. Devasher, 264 S.W. 1057 (Ky. 1924)81 Hall v. Hall, 828 S.W.2d 541 (Ky. 1959).
8 2 In re Gibson, 33 F. Supp. 838 (E.D. Ky. 1940); James v. Reeves, 215 S.W.
66 (Ky. 1919); Cryer v. McGuire, 146 S.W. 402 (Ky. 1912); Middleton v. Fields,
134 S.W. 180 (Ky. 1911); Jones v. Green, 83 S.W. 582 (Ky. 1904); Redmond's
Adm x v. Redmond, 66 S.W. 745 (Ky. 1902); Kimberlin v. Isaacs, 62 S.W. 494
(Ky. 1901); Freeman v. Mills, 59 S.W. 3 (Ky. 1900).
s Phillips v. Williams, 113 S.W. 908 (Ky. 1908).
84 Campbell v. Whisman, 209 S.W. 27 (Ky. 1919).85 Wilson's Adm'r v. Wilson, 156 S.W.2d (Ky. 1941).
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deed or conveyance if the real estate can be partitioned and divided.
However, if the real estate cannot be divided without materially im-
pairing its value or the value of the widow's interest therein, the
widow has a right to have the real estate sold free of dower and to
obtain a reasonable compensation out of the proceeds.86 In calculating
the present cash value of a widow's dower right in lieu of a life
estate the four percent maximum interest rate and life expectancy
as shown by the United States life tables and interest schedules pub-
lished in the latest edition of Kentucky Revised Statutes should be
used. 7 The Kentucky Court has also considered such variables as health,
vigor, and age of the widow in calculating the value of her dower
rights."" The debts of the decedent and the expenses of administra-
tion89 may not be deducted from the proceeds of the sale of land
before computing the value of the widow's dower interest.90
In the event that there is controversy concerning the election of
dower by the surviving spouse the claim for dower is assertible against
decedents heirs and not his personal representative. 91 The county
court has no right to appoint commissioners to assign dower, except
in cases where the husband died seised of the land. In cases where
the husband alienated lands92 before his death, the circuit court has
jurisdiction. In addition, the county court has no authority to allot
dower unless the allotment is uncontested.93 A widow's right of action
to recover dower does not accrue until the death of her husband and
hence the statute of limitations does not begin to run against her
until that time.94 The cause of action for dower has been classified as
an action for the recovery of real property, consequently a fifteen year
statute of limitations applies. 5
THE "FORCED SHARE"
Many states feel a compelling interest in requiring that the sur-
viving spouse be allowed to share in the deceased's estate. The
8o KRS §§ 881.135, 389.050 (1971); Moore v. United States, 214 F.Supp. 603
(Ky. 1963).
87KRS § 386.060 (1971); Morris v. Morris, 293 S.W.2d 243 (Ky. 1956).
8 8 Alexander's Exx v. Bradley, 66 Ky. (3 Bush.) 667 (1868).
s9 Mills Adm'x v. Mills, 265 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. 1954).
90 Additional procedural and evidentiary problems will be discussed infra.
9' Clore's Adm'r v. Clore, 284 S.W. 885 (Ky. 1926).
92 Rintch v. Cunningham, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb.) 462 (1816).
0 3 Garris' Heirs v. Garris, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 461 (1847); Murphey's Heirs v.
Murphey, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 232 (1846); Stevens' Heirs v. Stevens, 33 Ky. (3
Dana) 371 (1835); Williams v. Williams, 24 Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh) 105 (1829).
9 4Smith v. Myers, 7 Ky. Law Rep. 443, 13 Ky. Opin. 830 (1885).
9 Winchester v. Keith, 70 S.W. 664 (1902); Anderso's Trustee v. Sterritt, 79
Ky. 449, 8 Ky. Law Rep. 277 (1881).
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decision to guarantee the surviving spouse a share in the estate of the
other regardless of the desires of the decedent is based on various
policy considerations aimed at protection of the family unit; i.e., the
obligation of support, the presumed contribution of the survivor's
family, and the state's interest in protection from the burdens of
indigents as well as those policies favoring equality of the sexes,
economy in transmission of property, and fairness among beneficiaries.90
"Giving effect to these concepts, however, frustrates other such policies
as freedom of testamentary disposition, protection of creditors, and
alienability of land, all of which militiate against nonbarrable shares
for the surviving spouse."97
Eight community property states and Louisiana, a civil law state,
protect the surviving spouse primarily by providing for a form of
shared inter vivos ownership of marital property.98 Of the remaining
forty-one states, thirty-nine permit the surviving spouse to claim a
share in the estate of the deceased spouse,99 while only two states
leave the testator's wishes unfettered by inchoate dower. 00 Therefore,
most states, including those that have abolished dower, attempt to
protect the surviving spouse against disinheritance by giving that
spouse an election to take against the will (the "forced share"). One
example is the Model Probate Code which reads as follows:
The surviving spouse may elect to receive the share in the estate
that would have passed to him had the testator died intestate,
until the value of such share shall amount to [$5,000], and of the
residue of the estate above the part from which the full intestate
share amounts to [$5,000], one-half the estate that would have
passed to him had the testator died intestate.10'
The Uniform Probate Code also allows for the surviving spouse's
election against the will.'
0 2
96 Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem,
33 U'v. Gin. L. REv. 681 (1966). See also Wren, The Widow's Election: Draft-
ing and Tax Considerations in Community and Common Law States, 100 TRusTs &
EsTATEs 13 (1961).97 Plager, supra note 96, at 681.
98 Id. Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and
Washington.
99 Id. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming. South Carolina gives the surviving wife common law dower. The
District of Columbia gives the surviving spouse the right to choose by statute.
100 Id. North Dakota and South Dakota.
101 SIES, MODEL PROBATE CODE § 32a (1946).
102 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-201 et. seq. (1969).
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Kentucky allows the surviving spouse to renounce the will as
provided in KRS:
(1) When a husband or wife dies testate, the surviving spouse
may, though under full age, release what is given to him or her by
will, if any, and receive his or her share under KRS 392.020 as if no
will had been made, except that in such case the share in any real
estate of which the decedent or anyone for the use of the decedent
was seised of an estate in fee simple at the time of death shall be
only an estate for the surviving spouse's life in one-third of such
real estate. Such relinquishment shall be made within twelve
months after the probate, and acknowledged before and left for
record with the clerk of the court where probate was made, or
acknowledged before a subscribing witness and proved before and
left with the clerk. If, within those twelve months, an appeal is
taken from the judgment probating the will, the surviving spouse
need not make such relinquishment until within the twelve months
succeeding the time when the appeal is disposed of.
(2) Subsection 1 does not preclude the surviving spouse from
receiving his or her share under KRS 392.020, in addition to any
bequest or devise to him or her by will, if such is the intention of
the testator, plainly expressed in the will or necessarily inferable
from the will.03
In Kentucky, there exists a legal presumption that a devise to the
wife is in lieu of dower, and she is compelled to elect between the two,
unless a contrary intention is plainly expressed in the will or neces-
sarily inferable therefrom. 10 4 The share the surviving spouse may
elect (or "force"), regardless of the terms of the will, is a life estate
in one-third of any real estate of which the decedent was seised in fee
simple at the time of death, an absolute estate in one-half of the surplus
personalty left by the decedent, and a one-third life estate in any real
estate of which the other spouse was seised in fee simple during the
coverture but not at the time of death. 0 5
Thus, the Kentucky statutes give the surviving spouse who elects
against the decedents will a share less than what she would have
received in intestacy.'06 In the case of intestacy, the wife is entitled
to one-half of the real estate owned at death in fee. However, if she
elects against a will, she is entitled only to a life estate in one-third
103 KRS § 392.080 (1971).
'0 4 Wilson v. Fisher, 184 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1944); Huhlien v. Huhlien, 8
S.W.260 (Ky. 1888). See also Note, 9 So. CA. L.Q. 277 (1957).
105 KRS §§ 392.020 392.080 (1971). Kentucky labels everything given to the
surviving spouse under these sections "dower.
10025 Am. Jur.2d, Dower & Curtesy § 169 (1966). Generally states allow
spouse's electing against the will to receive a share equivalent to what they would
have taken in the event of intestacy. See also, Note, 47 Ky. L.J. 243 (1959).
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of the real property and the latter applies even though the will omits
her entirely.
0 7
A right to elect against the will is a personal right of the surviving
spouse. If the election is made according to statute, it is not con-
testable by devisees, legatees, heirs, or creditors. 0 8 However, there is
some authority to the effect that the privilege to elect may be delegated
to an agent during the lifetime but after the death of the elector
no such authority would be recognized in an agent or attorney.10 9
If the surviving spouse is incompetent, the general rule is that a
guardian or committee cannot make the election. It must be made
by a court of competent jurisdiction, usually the court having care
of the incompetent. However, some decisions indicate that not even
a court has the authority to make the election for the incompetent
surviving spouse.110
The Kentucky election statute stipulates a definite period (twelve
months) within which an election between the will or the statutory
share must be made. It has been held that failure to elect within the
required period operates as a release of dower and an acceptance of
the bequest."' However, where due to the condition of the estate,
it is impossible for the surviving spouse to make an intelligent election,
the court may extend the time to elect beyond twelve months. 112 An
election to take contrary to the will, made with knowledge of the
facts and not induced by fraud, cannot be withdrawn or revoked,
even within the time allowed for making renunciation, without an
order of the court.113 However, a revocation of the election may be
obtained where such election was procured through fraud or duress.
Dower, though inchoate during marriage, becomes absolutely vested
upon the death of a spouse. Testamentary provisions cannot deprive
a surviving spouse of dower unless consented to. If a will either
expressly or impliedly makes provision for a surviving spouse in lieu
of dower and that spouse elects to take under the will, the spouse may
not subsequently claim dower.114 "If in construing a will, there be
anything ambiguous or doubtful, and if the court cannot say that it
1o Hedden v. Hedden, 312 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1958).
108 25 AM. Jua.2d, Dower & Curtesy § 162 (1966).
109 Id.
110 25 Am. Jua.2d, Dower & Curtesy § 163 (1966).
111 Georgetown Nat'l Bank v. Ford, 285 S.W. 218 (Ky. 1926).
112 Mann v. Peoples-Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 256 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1953);
Brewer's Exr v. Smith, 45 S.W.2d 1036 (Ky. 1932).
113 Craven v. Craven, 205 S.W. 406 (Ky. 1918) (the widow must show good
cause to the court and cannot revoke at her pleasure).
114 Note, supra note 104, at 277.
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was clearly the intention to exclude, then the averment that the gift
was made in lieu of dower cannot be supported.""85
From the foregoing it is evident that the surviving spouse is
sufficiently protected from disinheritance and becoming a ward of
the state by the "forced share" statutes. Dower cannot be effectively
defeated by will, although the surviving spouse may be forced to
choose between the will and dower. In addition to this protection,
surviving spouses are also protected by "motive tests" which prevent
the depletion of surviving spouses' estates by unreasonable inter vivos
transfers.
FRtuDs ON TnE MA=rrAL SHARE
There appears to have developed three general lines of reasoning
or tests with variations used by courts as regards attempted evasions
of the marital share. One doctrine espoused by the courts is that of
"illusory transfers." The leading case in this area is Newman v. Dore18
where the husband, three days before his death, with the intent to
defeat the widow's statutory right created an inter vivos trust of all his
property. He retained the power to revoke the income for life. The
trustees were made subject to the settlor's control during his life and
could exercise their powers only as the settlor directed. The New
York Court of Appeals sustained the widow's attack on the trust and
stated that the essential test was whether the transfer was real or
illusory, that is, whether the husband in good faith divested himself of
ownership.117 "In sum, excessive control is decisive; intent (motive)
is immaterial."118 Thus, where the transfer is "illusory" the courts will
allow the marital share." 9 In addition, trusts that are deemed testa-
mentary may be held an invalid disposition and thus, the trust property
would form part of the decedents estate.
120
Another test is one based on the "reality" of the transfer. A transfer
has the requisite "reality" if it is in fact a valid inter vivos transfer.
In theory, the rights of the widow are not considered; the only transfers
which the widow may successfully attack are testamentary transfers
and sham transfers. Therefore, if the transfer is complete' 21 or the
"15 Id. at 277. Note that in Kentucky the devise in the will is presumed to be
in lieu of dower.
110 9 N.E.2d 966 (N.Y. 1937).
117 Id. at 969.
118W. MAcDoNALD, FnAuD oN = Wmow's SELP= 75 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as MAcDoNALD].
119 See Note Trusts-Will The Creation of a Trust Defeat a Spouse's Statutory
Allowances 34 K'y. L.J. 296 (1946), for the effect of the creation of an inter vivos
trust on a spouse's statutory allowance.
120 MAcDoNALD at 69-73.
321 In re Halpern's Estate, 100 N.E.2d 120 (N.Y. 1951).
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transferee obtained a present interest 12 2 as soon as the transfer was
made, the transfer becomes invulnerable to the widow's attack.12
3
The third test is based on the "intent" of the transferror in making
the transfer. If the intent was to deprive the surviving spouse of the
marital share, the transfer will be subject to the rights of the surviving
spouse. If, on the other hand, the intent was something other than to
deprive the spouse of a marital share, the transfer will be upheld.124
Kentucky seems to have adopted a variation of the intent or motive
doctrine. Thus, where a man who has an estate acquired largely
through the skill and industry of his first wife, now deceased, conveys
land worth $9,000 to three children by the first wife pursuant to
promises made to her, the conveyance is considered reasonable Vhen
made in good faith, without an intent to defraud. The conveyance
will usually be upheld against the second wife's claim for dower in
the lands.12 5 However, if the gift of property is made with the
expressed "intenf' of depriving his widow of her share, the gift will be
set aside as a fraud on the widow even though the widow's dower
in the remaining land is sufficient to afford her support.126  In
determining intent:
The court must look to the condition of the parties, and all the
attending circumstances, in judging of the transaction. It should
take into consideration the amount of the husband's estate, the
value of the advancements, the time within which they are made,
and all other indicia which will serve to determine the intention
accompanying the transaction. If, however, a gift or voluntary
conveyance of all or the greater portion of his property be made to
his children by a former marriage without the knowledge of the
intended wife, or it be advanced to them after marriage without
the wife's knowledge, a prima facie case of fraud arises; and it rests
upon the beneficiaries to explain away such presumption. 127
Following this rationale, the Court in Wilson v. Wilson128 set aside as
a fraud on the marital rights, a gift of bank shares and a note to the
children which if allowed to stand, would have left the widow
destitute. In constrast, a husband's gift causa mortis of money which
he had on deposit in a bank was held not to be a fraud on the wife
where the proceeds of a life insurance policy and the amount given
122 Pruett v. Cowsart, 72 S.E. 30 (Ga. 1911).
3.
2
3 MAcDoNALD at 120-28.
124 Id. at 103-08.
125 Fennessey v. Fennessey, 2 S.W. 158 (Ky. 1886).
' 26 Manikee's Adm'x v. Beard, 2 S.W. 545 (Ky. 1887).
127 Murray v. Murray, 13 S.W. 244, 246 (Ky. 1890).
128 64 S.W. 981 (Ky. 1901).
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her were equal to one-half of the money, and was all that she was
entitled to under the dower statute.
129
In Payne v. Tatem,130 the Court reiterated that the burden of
proving that the intent was not to deprive the spouse of her marital
share was on the donee. In addition, the Court indicated that the
presumption might be overcome by showing a promise to the first wife
to provide for the children, reasonable gifts or advancements by a
husband to his children by former marriage, or a showing of the
former wife's assistance in compiling the husband's estate.' 3' Again
in 1937, the court stated that where a husband makes a gift of all or a
greater portion of his property without his wife's consent a prima facie
case of fraud arises and beneficiaries have the burden to explain
away such presumption.8 2 Likewise, where a man reduced his estate
from $100,000 to $500 by a series of ingenious transfers to his children
by a former marriage8 3 and also where immediately before the mar-
riage a man voluntarily transferred his entire estate to his sister,134
such transfers were held to be frauds on the wife's marital rights. In
Benge v. Barnett,135 the Kentucky Court found a fraud on the marital
rights where a husband made a transfer to his brothers and sisters of
45 percent of his personalty. The court found the husband's intention
by looking at his acts and deeds, especially the fact that in his will
executed one month before his death, he sought to deprive his widow
of any interest in the personalty owned at his death.
The courts have fashioned a body of case law which enables a
surviving spouse to attack in some instances attempted evasion of
marital share. Through use of the aforementioned tests, the courts
have often been able to prevent the serious inequities which flow
from the disinheritance of the spouse. However, even under the close
scrutiny of the courts, methods have been devised to prevent a spouse's
inchoate dower from attaching as discussed below.
It has been suggested that the marital share could be defeated by
a contract to make a will. For instance, where one spouse executes a
contract to make a will with another person, then fails to carry out
his part of the bargain it is conceivable that the latter could become a
judgment creditor and thus participate in the decedents estate before
' 29 Weber v. Salisbury, 148 S.W. 34 (Ky. 1912).
13033 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Ky. 1930).
'3' See Goff v. Goffs Ex'rs, 193 S.W. 1009 (Ky. 1917); Fennessey v. Fennes-
sey, 2 S.W. 158 (Ky. 1886).
132 Rove v. Ratliff, 104 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1937).
'33 Cochran's Adm'x v. Cochran, 115 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1938).
'34 Martin v. Martin, 138 S.W.2d 509 (Ky. 1940).
135 217 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1949).
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the surviving spouse. However, in Kentucky, such contracts would
seem to come under the close scrutiny of the "intent" test.
Mlmos To Punvmur INCHOATE DowER FR oM ATTACHMN
Although the courts and statutes have attempted to protect the
surviving spouse, several methods have been devised to prevent
inchoate dower from attaching. It is not intended that this discussion
be all inclusive. Only examples will be discussed to demonstrate that
inchoate dower may be prevented from attaching and thus the policy
of the dower statute 3 6 nullified.
One method of preventing the attachment of inchoate dower is the
acquisition of real estate by a wholly owned corporation. 13 7 "If real
estate is conveyed to a corporation, the stock of the corporation is
personal property and not subject to dower even if the corporation
is solely owned by the husband. Thus, if the husband incorporates
his real estate at the time of acquisition, he can prevent his wife from
exercising any control over its transfer."
138
A second method of preventing the attachment of inchoate dower
is the creation of a survivorship device such as a joint tenancy with
right of survivorship. One of the prerequisites in order for dower
to attach is that the husband be seised of an estate of inheritance.139
The husband will not be "seised of an estate of inheritance" if the
real estate is conveyed to himself and another with right of survivor-
ship.140 Although this device may be impossible in some states, it is
still possible in most states.' 41 Kentucky allows creation of joint
tenancies with survivorship but the instrument must express that
intention clearly.'42 Likewise, real estate used as partnership property
is not subject to dower rights of the surviving spouse of a deceased
partner.
43
Thirdly, inchoate dower does not attach to life estates and therefore
dower may be defeated by a life estate with an unrestricted power of
136 KRS § 392.020 (1971).
'37 MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 93 § 3-202 Comment (1969).
138 Lewis, It's Time to Abolih Dow~r and Curtesy in Virginia, 3 UNrv. RICH.
L. flxv. 299, 306 (1969). See also R. MiNrER, IREAL PhoPEInrr, § 255 (2d ed.
1928).
189 See Part II, supra.
140 Lewis, supra note 138, at 306.
141 MAcDoNALD at 212-14.
142 KRS § 381.120 (1971) and KRS § 381.130 (1971). See Osborne v.
Hughes, 292 S.W. 748 (Ky. 1927). But see Davis v. Logan, 39 Ky. (9 Dana)
185 (1839) where a widow was allowed dower interest in land which her husband
held as a joint tenant (the deed did not clearly show a right of survivorship by the
other joint tenants).
143 See cases cited supra note 34.
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disposition.144 For example, a husband can have land conveyed to him
as life tenant with a general power of appointment with the remainder
interest reserved for his children upon his death if the power of appoint-
ment is not exercised. 45 However, a conveyance giving the husband
a life estate with a remainder to his heirs may not prevent inchoate
dower from attaching in a jurisdiction where the rule in Shelley's Case
has not been abolished.146
Lastly, inchoate dower is barred where the real estate is held in
trust by the surviving spouse.
If the husband wants to defeat the wife's dower and marital rights,
he can have real estate purchased by him conveyed to a trust under
the terms of which he retains a life interest in the trust corpus and
such control thereof that he has almost as much enjoyment of and
control over the property as he would have if he held the fee simple
titIe.147
As the foregoing indicates although courts have afforded dower
much protection, several clever conveyances are available which may
be used effectively to bar inchoate dower.148 Thus, serious doubts are
raised as to whether the protection afforded the surviving spouse by
inchoate dower is effective.
THE CAsE FoR Tmi ABOLiTON OF INCHOATE DowR
Obsolescence of Inchoate Dower As A Protective Device
In the times in which the estate of dower originated, the primary
source of wealth was real property and dower protected the widow
from being left destitute and becoming a burden on society. The
primary source of wealth today, except in some rural areas, has shifted
from real property to personal property. 49 For most individuals, today
wealth is made up of social security benefits, life insurance, pensions
and annuities, securities, joint bank accounts and numerous other
sources of personal property. As a result of this shift in wealth, the
Middle Age concept of dower has lost much of its potential as a means
of protecting the surviving spouse from destitution. Today, the dower
interest will represent only a small portion of the decedents real estate
1
4 4 
MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 93, § 3-202, Comment (1969).
' 45 Lewis, supra note 138, at 306.
146 Note, Inchoate Dower Today, 96 UNIV. PA. L. REBv. 677, 690-1 (1948).
See also Note, Powers of Appointment in Virginia, 47 VA. L. REv. 711 (1961).
The Rule in Shelley's Case has been abolished in Kentucky. See KRS § 381.090
(1971).
147 Lewis, supra note 138, at 307.
148 Note, Inchoate Dower Today, 96 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 677, 690 (1948).
See also, B. MINOR & J. WURTS, REAL PROPRTY §§ 272-6 (1909).
149 Lewis, supra note 138, at 307-8.
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and this is more true when the surviving spouse is of advanced age.Y50
For example, in Kentucky the inchoate dower interest is only a life
estate in one-third of the realty conveyed away during a covertureYx '
Assume that the surviving spouse is sixty-five years old, the decedent
conveyed away during the marriage real property worth one hundred
thousand dollars, and the surviving spouse has a valid claim to dower.
The value of the life estate is $12,600.152 This value also assumes that
a reasonable purchaser would be willing to purchase a life estate from
one of the advanced age of sixty-five, and since such life estates are
of questionable marketability the protection dower affords may be
illusory.
Moreover, legal life estates in real property have become archaic.
Fee ownership by the survivor, whatever his fractional statutory
share, eliminates most of the difficulties incidental to assignment of
common-law dower by simplifying joint management of the land
with the children, by reducing partition problems and by doing
away with the artificial valuation of the interest according to the
mortality tables.'58
As a result of the factors enumerated above the ancient inchoate dower,
useful in its time, lacks the vitality and effectiveness to carry out its
protective purposes in the twentieth century.
Adverse Effects on Real Estate Transfers
Inchoate dower creates problems that include a clog on title and
in the extreme case a restraint on alienation. As one commentator5
has remarked:
To begin with, dower is an irritating fetter on inter vivos alienation
of land. From the viewpoint of the seller, his wife's consent must be
obtained formally. This may be difficult where the wife bears her
husband ill will. She may even have left him, with her whereabouts
unknown. There may be factual and legal doubts as to her mental
competence, even though she may not be confined in an institution.
If she is intitutionalized, legal proceedings may be necessary in
order to sell the land to raise money for maintenance. And, from
the purchaser's viewpoint, there is always the possibility of dower
being claimed by the wife of a party in the chain of title. The pos-
150 See generally, REPORT or =H VmGnuA ADVISoRY LEGISLATIVE CouNCmI
TO Tim GOVERNOR AND THE GENmL ASSEmLY OF VmGINIA ON Co siIoSNEns
or Accomurrs AND Fucumus 8-9 (1967).
'55 KRS § 392.020 (1971).
152 This figure was computed by using the "Life Interest Table" in KRS' Life
Expectancy and Annuity Tables, (Vol. 1, Baldwin's ed. 1969).
153 Matthews, Dower, Principal and Income, Perpetuities, and Intestate Suc-
cession, 45 Ky. L.J. 111, 114 (1956).
1 5 4
MAcDoNALD, at 62-63.
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sibility may exist for an indefinite time after the death of the hus-
band concerned. If a wife refuses to release her dower, it may
mean court proceedings to compensate the purchaser or possible
loss of the sale. The existence of intricate legal questions as to the
existence of dower, combined with factual and legal doubts as to the
validity of a particular marriage in the chain of title, may require
costly title searches or title insurance. It is perhaps fair to state
that inchoate dower adversely affects the price of real estate and
to that extent defeats its own protective purpose.155
Not only would the abolition of inchoate dower remove a restraint
on the alienation of real property, from a practical standpoint the
attorney's tasks would be simplified.156 For example:
157
(1) It would no longer be necessary for the attorney to take
the word of a grantor that he is unmarried or to search the court
records for divorce proceedings if he says he is divorced.
(2) Frequently at a closing, one spouse appears with a deed
which has already been signed by the other. It is impossible to
ascertain whether or not the signature is actually that of the spouse.
This would no longer be important.
(3) In examining titles in the future, when it is found that
no recital has been made as to the marital status of the grantor, no
question will arise. This is a major problem today even if the lack
of recital occurs far back in the chain of title because adverse
possession, which removes many title defects by the passage of
time, possibly will not serve to bar dower....
(4) A grantors recalcitrant spouse would not be able to pre-
vent the sale of real estate by refusal to sign the deed of convey-
ance.
(5) There would be no need to worry if the grantor's spouse
were mentally incompetent and, therefore, unable to execute the
deed.
(6) Real estate transactions could be more rapidly conducted
without the need to arrange for the signing of a deed by the
grantor's spouse.
(7) The attorney would not have to create a trust or corpora-
tion to which the real estate could be conveyed in a situation where
the purchaser wished to prevent his spouse from having a veto
power over a later conveyance of the property.
158
Kentucky's Existing Scheme for Protecting Surviving Spouses
Aside from the practical advantages to the attorney, there is much
to be said for the pure statutory share approach today. 59 Moreover,
155 Id., See also 1 A-m cAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.37 (AJ. Casner ed.
1952).
156 Matthews, supra note 153.
157 Lewis, supra note 138, at 311.
158 Id. As regards (5) in the text, see KRS § 392.140 (1971).
159 Matthews, supra note 153.
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as discussed above, at the present time, when so much of the wealth of
a decedent is likely to be in the form of personal property, inchoate
dower does allow adequate provision for the surviving spouse.' €°
The one-third life estate granted Kentucky spouses is not that much
protection as pointed out above. The statutory 61 share seems to be
an adequate substitute for inchoate dower, especially in the case of
intestacy in Kentucky.
162
In addition to the statutory share protection granted in intestate
cases, Kentucky also allows the surviving spouse to elect against the
will 63 thereby thwarting the decedent's effort to totally disinherit
the surviving spouse. Although the survivor's share is less than in the
case of intestacy, usually it will leave the surviving spouse far from
destitute. Furthermore, it is significant that surviving spouses receive
one-half of the personalty absolutely in light of the shift in wealth from
real to personal property.
In addition, Kentucky provides a third line of defense for surviving
spouses. The "intent" test prevents the transfer of all or a substantial
portion of an estate without proof that the transfer was not a fraud
on the marital share. A prima facie case is made out by establishing
the fact of transfer, and the burden falls upon the recipients of the
transfer to prove otherwise. 16 4
The problem of estate depletion sought to be corrected by these
"intent" cases might be more adequately dealt with by the addition of
a statutory section dealing with inter vivos transfers. Such a statute
would reclaim as part of the decedent's net estate for purposes of
calculating the marital share certain inter vivos transfers thought to
be a fraud on the marital share. Such transfers should include: (1)
gifts causa mortis, (2) joint checking accounts payable to survivor,
(3) money deposited in name of decedent in trust for another remain-
ing on deposite at decedents death, (4) joint property held by
decedent with right of survivorship, and (5) revocable trusts.1 5 Estate
tax consequences tend to provide an incentive for spouses not to disin-
herit the other. Estates which take full advantage of the marital
deduction'66 will generally leave the surviving spouse well provided
for.
160 SINES, MODEL PROBATE CODE § 31, Comment (1946).
161 KRS § 892.020 (1971).
162 There seems to be no logical reason for the difference between the sur-
viving spouse's share in the case of intestacy and the surviving spouse's share in the
case of renunciation of the decedent's will. See Note, 47 Ky. L.J. 243 (1959).
163 KRS 392.080 (1971).
164 See Section VI in text.
165 See e.g. N.Y. ESTATES, PowEIs & Tsiusrs LAw 5-11 (McKinney 1967);
UNIFOmn PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1969).
166 INr. REv. CODE of 1964, § 2056.
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The benefits to be gained in allowing free alienation of land seems
to outweigh any disadvantages that exist from abolishing inchoate
dower. Kentucky's three lines of defense (1) forced share in the case
of intestacy, (2) election against the will in the testate case, and (3)
the "intent" or "motive" test as applied to conveyances which act as a
fraud on the marital share,167 offers adequate protection for the sur-
viving spouse.'6
8
Other jurisdictions have abolished either all or part of the remnants
of common law dower. At one extreme North Dakota has not only
abolished dower and allowed conveyances of realty without the
consent of the other spouse, but as well, a testator is allowed to dispose
of his entire estate by will subject only to a homestead exemption.169
Maryland has also recently abolished dower170 while retaining the
marital intestate share171 and election against the will. 172 Other states
have retained dower but have limited its attachment to property of
which the deceased spouse was seised at death.17 Some states have
retained provisions to prevent the grantor from conveying away realty
without the consent of the other spouse but have abolished dower.' 4
In addition to providing for expanded forced shares and election
against the will as discussed above, the Uniform Probate Code 75 and
the Model Probate Code17 also abolish dower.
As noted previously problems exist in the various states' definition
of dower. In 1956 KRS 392.020 was amended to define dower as any-
thing the surviving spouse takes under that provision. The troublesome
provision in that statute that needs to be removed is the phrase:
[The surviving spouse] shall have an estate for his or her life in one-
third of any real estate of which the other spouse or anyone for the
use of the other spouse, was seised of an estate in fee simple during
the coverture but not at the time of death, unless the survivor's
right to such interest has been barred, forfeited or relinquished.177
167 Nonetheless, Kentucky's present statutory scheme in this area could be
further improved, i.e., increasing the statutory share, reclamation of certain inter
vivos transfers for purposes of computing the marital share by statute.
168 Some additional protection is provided the surviving spouse through the
homestead exemption. See KRS §§ 427.060-427.100 (1971).
169 N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-0709, 56-0102 (1960); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-
01 (Supp. 1967).
17oMD. ANN. CODE, Art. 93 § 3-202 (1969). Dower was abolished in Georgia
and Oregon in 1969-GA. CODE ANN. § 31 (Note 1969); ORE. REv. STAT. §
112685 (1969).17 1 
MD. ANNr. CODE, Art. 93 § 3-102 (1969).
17 2 MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 93 § 3-203 (1969).
173 See Lewis, supra note 138, at 310.
174 Id. at 309.17 5 UNIoFRM PROBATE CODE § 2-113 (1969).
176 Simes, MODEL PROBATE CODE § 31 (1946).
177KRS § 392.020 (1971).
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This is the only existing remnant of common law dower under KRS
892.020. Without the above phrase KRS 892.020 becomes a pure statu-
tory share provision, which adequately protects the surviving spouse
in the event of intestacy while eliminating a burdensome restraint on
alienation. It would appear that the only reform necessary to imple-
ment abolition of dower would be the deletion of the above quoted
phrase.
Constitutionality
There appear to be no constitutional problems in abolishing the
inchoate right of dower provided in KRS 392.020. Dower is a creature
of statute founded on reasons of public policy, and is subject, while
it remains inchoate, to such modifications and qualifications as legisla-
tive authority may see proper to impose.178 Inchoate rights of dower
are within the control of state legislatures and such rights are not
protected from state action by the federal constitution.1 9 As the
Supreme Court of the United States has said:
[A]t most [dower] is a right which, while it exists, is attached to
the marital contract of relation; and it always has been deemed
subject to regulation by each State as respects property within its
limits.... Neither § 2 of Article IV nor the Fourteenth Amend-
ment takes from the several States the power to regulate this sub-
ject; nor does either make it a privilege or immunity of citizen-
ship.180
Also the Kentucky Constitution would present no obstacles to the
abolition of dower.
The inchoate right of dower does not vest in a surviving spouse
until the death of the decedent spouse who owns the land. Thus,
"inchoate dower is not so vested as to be immune to statutory
destruction." 181 It has also been held that inchoate dower may be
abolished retroactively. "The General Assembly could reasonably
conclude, as have the legislatures of many of our sister states as well
as Parliament, that the public interest required that the rights of dower
be abolished retroactively."
8 2
CONCLUSION
Inchoate dower is no longer an effective method of protecting the
178 Goodman v. Gerstle, 109 N.E.2d 489 (Ohio 1952).
179 Silberman v. Jacobs, 267 A.2d 209 (Md. 1970).
180 Ferry v. Spokane P. & S. Ry. Co., 258 U.S. 314, 318 (1922). See also Ran-
dall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S. 137 (1874).
1812 R. POWELL, REAL PRoPERTY § 213(3) (1967).
182 Silberman v. Jacobs, 267 A.2d 209, 221 (Md. 1970).
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surviving spouse from destitution in that it lacks the vitality and
efficacy to carry out its original protective purposes in today's world.
Inchoate dower creates a variety of problems in the transfer of real
property today and in some cases is an active restraint on alienation.
In addition inchoate dower complicates the attorney's tasks in assisting
clients with real estate conveyances. The adverse effects of inchoate
dower seem to far outweigh any benefits that remain extant. The
case for the abolition of inchoate dower is indeed a strong one and
Kentucky law should be revised to effectuate the policies of today.
KRS 392.020 can be revised in such a way as to abolish the remnant
of common law dower present within it as is indicated by the proposed
statute in the appendix. The suggested modification of the statute
would be effective as to the estates of persons dying on or after the
effective date of the amending legislation.
loseph H. Vah~sng
William E. Hudson
APPENDIX
KRS 392.020 should be amended to read as follows:
After the death of the husband or wife intestate, the survivor
shall have an estate in fee of one-half of the surplus real estate of
which the other spouse, or anyone for the use of the other spouse,
was seised of an estate in fee simple at the time of death. The
survivor shall also have an absolute estate in one-half of the sur-
plus personalty left by the decedent. Unless the context other-
wise requires, any reference in the statutes of this state to "dower"
or "curtesy" shall be deemed to refer to the surviving spouse's
interest created by this section.
This amendment is effective as to estates of persons dying on or
after ........................................ , 197 ..... 383
183 ICRS § 392.080, the forced share statute, and other statutes that refer to
KRS § 392.020 would incorporate this amendment.
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